Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also would like

to thank Chairman Royce and your being able to put this hearing

together this morning.

I also would like to personally welcome our distinguished witnesses

who will be giving us their sense of expertise on this very

important issue of North Korea.

Mr. Chairman, on the 10th of this month, the North Korean foreign

ministry issued a statement in which Pyongyang announced

that he would increase his nuclear weapons arsenal and suspend

its participation in the Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s nuclear

weapons program.

North Korea claims its stance is in response to comments made

recently by Secretary of State Rice, during her confirmation hearings

of which she referenced North Korea as, and I quote, ‘‘an outpost

of tyranny.’’

North Korea interpreted these remarks to mean that the United

States, ‘‘cannot find one single word on coexistence with us and

Pyongyang upped the ante as a result.’’ Somewhat of a similar vintage

when President Bush described North Korea as one of the

three axis of evil.

The reaction by the Six-Party participants has been low key.

However, the United States intelligence community estimates that

North Korea has possessed enough weapons grade plutonium for

one and possibly two nuclear weapons since the early 1990s.

In fact, the United States intelligence community believes that

North Korea has enough weapons grade plutonium for about six to

eight nuclear weapons.

North Korea has been operating a reactor at Yongbyon since late

February 2003, which has produced or can produce enough plutonium

for about one bomb per year.

North Korea has also two larger nuclear reactors that were

under construction, but frozen under the 1994 Agreed Framework

within President Clinton’s Administration. If completed, these reactors

would provide enough plutonium for about 37 to 50 nuclear

bombs per year.

This said, Mr. Chairman, the situation with North Korea, I humbly

submit, is very serious. The Six-Party Talks were established

to energize the regional players most affected and to apply collective

pressure and offer collective solutions.

Nevertheless, North Korea continues to escalate its challenges

and in June 2004, the United States tabled an extensive proposal,

which includes, as a first step, commitment from North Korea to

dismantle all of its nuclear weapons.

In return, South Korea and Japan would supply North Korea

with heavy fuel oil and the United States would be prepared to discuss

lifting remaining economic sanctions against North Korea. The

Six-Party participants would also begin a study of North Korea’s

energy needs.

In short, Mr. Chairman, North Korea would receive a more enduring

security guarantee, as well as a lasting non-nuclear solution

to its energy needs.

In light of North Korea’s recent announcement that it was suspending

participation in the Six-Party Talks the Administration

has emphasized, the June 2004 proposal remains on the table.

But is a diplomatic solution still possible? Should the United

States engage in direct talks with North Korea? And under what

conditions will countries in the region consider more coercive alternatives?

In a yesterday’s *New York Times* article, it is quoted under Secretary

of State Robert Zoellick’s views suggesting that here again

North Korea is just saber rattling and just bluffing and not much

to depend in terms of all the rhetoric that we have heard recently

from North Korea.

That being said, I don’t know if this means a major shift in our

foreign policy with a statement from Mr. Zoellick, but these are the

questions that must be answered, and I certainly welcome our witnesses

and look forward to their comments and especially I want

to welcome Mr. Cossa—it is about 4:30 or 5 o’clock in the morning

right now in Honolulu—for his being able to listen in to our hearing

this morning and certainly look forward to hearing his comments

about the issue that we are discussing this morning.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Somewhat of a perspective perhaps differently in terms of what

I have heard, not only from the Members of the Committee, but

also from our expert witnesses this morning.

Mr. Cossa, you indicated in your statement to say that North

Korea, by pursuing nuclear weapons, makes them less secure. I

wonder who really is less secure, who we are talking about.

It seems that this is the sense of threat and concern and anxiety

that countries like Japan and all the other countries in the Asian

rim, it seems to me that they are the ones that are less secure than

North Korea.

I know perhaps that the meaning of your statement here is that

if you develop these nuclear weapons, we are going to blast the hell

out of you and I don’t think that is a possible option to pursue either,

given the fact that they do have the capability of giving the

ballistic missiles that seems to go over Japan, potentially reaching

Hawaii and now the capability that it can even reach the north or

the western portions of the United States.

I am trying to say there is somewhat of a contradiction to say

that who are we really talking about being less secure? It seems

that our security is being less secured, simply by the fact that

North Korea makes this claim that it is necessary that they also

develop a nuclear weapon system.

I think some of the most profound changes of our national foreign

policy has taken place in the period of the last 4 years, and

I make this reference to President Bush’s statements as it was

taken into action in terms of our relationship with Iraq.

The most central theme, in my humble opinion as to why we

waged war in Iraq, was this mushroom cloud that Secretary Condi

Rice had indicated probability, just say even if to think that Iraq

and Saddam Hussein has nuclear weapons in his possession, suggestions

by the highest levels of the Bush Administration officials,

that yes, they do have nuclear weapons. We know where they are.

This presumption were two basic doctrines as it now evolved and

please clarify for me, because I am not an expert on these doctrines,

preemption. The doctrine of unilateralism now seems to be

the focus.

As I recall, the first thing that the Bush Administration did was

to condemn President Clinton’s efforts to conduct a bilateral relationship

to work with the North Koreans. Treat them as coequals.

But now North Korea is an outpost of tyranny. It is an axis of

evil, and I think by implication of what my Chairman has tried to

say here is, where is the people-to-people relationship?

It is almost like a Rodney Dangerfield, ‘‘I get no respect,’’ from

these people so I am going to develop my own nuclear bomb and

see who is going to come up to me and say, ‘‘Look, let us be sensible.

Let us talk.’’ Positives.

Also, the question of, say, putting pressure on China disturbs me

in the sense that I am a proud Chinese who says, ‘‘What am I?

Your messenger to do this?’’

Culturally to me it is an insult that I would be pressured to become

a little doll to go over there and do the biddings of these

Western nations who are concerned about their own security because

of North Korea’s potential capability of developing nuclear

weapons.

I think what we are dealing with here basically, I guess the word

that I put here in my notes is trust. North Koreans don’t trust us.

Why should they trust us, when some of these policies that we

have enunciated in the past and applied by use of force in the last

4 years?

If I was a Chinese official, I would be confused myself as to what

exactly our foreign policy is. A sense of consistency to deal with

countries who potentially may possess nuclear weapons is dangerous,

because this is what we have done by applying the policy

of preemption, not necessarily verifying if Saddam Hussein had nuclear

weapons.

Even to believe that he may have nuclear weapons, let us blast

the heck out of him, because of the fear that it may be too late for

us to act rather than to react and to know later that Saddam Hussein

may have these nuclear weapons.

As you mentioned, Mr. Wolfsthal, we don’t have accurate information

or data on the whole question of what nuclear capabilities

that North Korea has, and that is dangerous too, in my humble

opinion.

I really enjoyed your statements because it really raises some

very serious issues.

Now some may suggest that our relationship or what we are

doing with Iraq has no relationship with North Korea. I beg to differ.

The fact that the nuclear weapons issue was one of the central

issues that led us to wage war against Saddam Hussein, I think

we have got some very serious issues to deal with as well with

North Korea.

This is where I am a little confused and I would love you gentlemen

to help me along this line of thinking. If I am way off line,

please educate me on this question. Thank you. Start off with Mr.

Eberstadt.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen.

Unfortunate situation, as I recall, when Secretary

of State Colin Powell publicly stated that it was his intention

to continue the dialogue with the fact that even our own Secretary

of State, Madeleine Albright, the first ever to go to North

Korea, the Sunshine Policy was condemned initially by the Bush

Administration.

In fact, it was very embarrassing for Secretary Colin Powell to

learn, after making these public statements, that we are going to

change this thing. And it was very, very bad medicine, the signals

that we sent not only to North Korea, but to Asia, with how we

treated the President of South Korea, when he came here, almost

with contempt. Very embarrassing. Losing face. Giving them a

sense like they don’t even count in the process.

And I think this is where, when we send mixed signals, there is

no consistent policy coming out and I don’t say just of the Bush Administration,

any Administration for that matter, I think this is

what complicates the matter and I just wanted to add that this is

what happened, as I recall, when the Secretary of State Colin Powell

first came out in a very positive attitude and says let us continue

this.

I think there are some positives coming out of the 1994 agreement,

even though there are problems, but let us correct them. But

that wasn’t the case and we just completely shut everything off,

and I just wanted to note that for the record, Mr. Chairman. I

know my time is way over now and I will hold it at that. Thank

you.

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